This article traces the history of the "battle of Whitman Park," a twenty-sevenyear-long controversy over the construction of a public housing project in a white working class neighborhood in South Philadelphia. By the late 1970s, it was the longest-running housing dispute in the United States and one of the longest conflicts over a liberal welfare program in American history. Sketching white community's development along with the racial, class, and gender politics involved in planning, protesting, and building the housing project, the article draws broader arguments about poverty and political development in postwar urban America.
to the project. Both Street and the Whitman Council promised peaceful demonstrations, but city officials feared violence as the two protests converged on the small neighborhood. Philadelphia police kept the picketers separated as a shouting match ensued. One protester waved the Pan-African flag high above the heads of the protesters as African American marchers reportedly yelled "We're fired up, ain't gonna take no more" over the police barricade. "You're not going to be my neighbors," some Whitman residents replied. Others held American flags and carried signs reading "We Did It The Mortgage Way." Tempers flared as harder rain began to fall, but Street kept his promise of nonviolence when he led the protest away from Whitman and on a nearly four mile march to City Hall. The protesters traded taunts and insults, but the rallies ended peacefully, just another skirmish in the long and bitter controversy known citywide as "the Battle of Whitman Park." 1 Milton Street had earned a reputation for confrontational protests long before he turned his attention to the public housing controversy in South Philadelphia. 2 In Whitman, he intentionally invoked the memory of the United States' most venerated civil rights leader when he scheduled his rally for April 4, 1979 , thereby linking the availability of low-income public housing to the broader struggle for racial justice and desegregation. Other local black leaders made similar comparisons. Some alluded to the Jim Crow South to discredit Whitman Park opponents, calling the Whitman neighborhood "Deep South Philadelphia" for its geographic location in the city and the specter it raised about segregationist resistance in the American South. 3 A year after Milton Street's rally, when lawyer and activist Charles Bowser called for another march on Whitman, he compared efforts to halt construction to "George Wallace standing in the school house door." 4 The Whitman community rejected the comparisons and denied the controversy was a civil rights issue. Local resident Barry Mitchell took offense when Bowser announced another march, calling him a "lousy rat" for "equating us with bigotry in the South." 5 When Milton Street scheduled his rally on the anniversary of King's assassination, the Whitman Council embraced it. "Come on down," said long-time Council president Fred Druding. "We'll demonstrate with you," he continued. "Peaceful demonstrations were Martin Luther King's badge of courage. . . . We, the people of Whitman, are also peaceful demonstrators seeking to improve our community." 6 Druding also likened his community's action with King's legacy. They, too, considered Whitman Park an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rights of homeowners that "did it the mortgage way." Publicly, the Whitman Council insisted that race did not factor into their community's opposition. Instead, they argued it would lower property values, introduce crime and blight, and disrupt their close-knit community of hard working homeowners.
Near its end, the battle of Whitman Park was the longest-running housing dispute in the United States. 7 While it was ostensibly a local controversy over a single public housing project, the conflict highlights much broader developments in the history of civil rights and political realignment in modern urban America. This article examines the controversy from when the city first proposed public housing as part of the neighborhood's urban renewal plan in the mid-1950s until the first tenants moved into the complex in 1982. It combines the community's regeneration through urban renewal and structural change with the politics, planning, and protest of public housing. Bringing the proponents and opponents of public housing into a single narrative and examining the interwoven racial, class, and gender politics involved, the article also draws broader conclusions about politics and poverty in postwar urban America. It argues that the interactions and contestations between competing sides in the battle of Whitman Park contributed to the creation of a welfare rights movement that espoused a broad commitment to race-conscious welfare liberalism. At the same time, however, the controversy also produced a nominally "colorblind" neighborhood protectionist movement that adopted a populist conservatism based upon the selective rejection of welfare state entitlements.
As Felicia Hornbluh has acknowledged, the welfare rights movement that forced policymakers to address questions of racial disparities in public policy also engendered a reaction that caused a withdrawal of support for state-sponsored anti-poverty programs. 8 Historians Robert Self and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall further argue that scholars need to write the social histories of the civil rights movement and modern conservatism together in order to show how their agendas and strategies developed reciprocally. 9 Although the predominantly white, blue-collar residents of Whitman did not fall into neat categories like "liberal" and "conservative," by the 1970s they actively supported Philadelphia's former police commissioner turned mayor, Frank Rizzo. Perhaps the archetypical example of late twentieth century urban, white ethnic, populist conservatism, Rizzo championed their cause as well. 10 More importantly, however, Whitman residents began rejecting state and federally enforced welfare and desegregation programs. But the tendency to view white opposition to the welfare state in starkly racist terms has led to what Matthew Lassiter calls a "race-reductionist narrative" of postwar American urban and political development. 11 Recent histories of the urban South and New Right have shown that monolithic depictions of resistance to integration undervalue the complexities of white accommodation to and even appropriation of the civil rights movement. 12 As Fred Druding's attempt to indentify with Martin Luther King's legacy exemplified, the Whitman Council also learned to accommodate civil rights discourse for their own ends. They understood that the civil rights movement altered the politics of race and housing equality. Druding and the Council carefully avoided the mention of race in their public denunciations of Whitman Park. Maintaining their community's supposed "colorblindness," they deliberately eschewed claims to their community's shared whiteness when claiming their right to benefit from liberal programs like urban renewal.
Nancy MacLean and others rightly emphasize modern conservatives' advocacy of "colorblind" public policies as a means to oppose the enforcement of equal opportunity programs. But scholars' focus on neoconservative intellectuals neglects how colorblind conservatism functioned at the grassroots, among working-and lower-middle class whites. These analyses also overlook colorblind conservatism's frequent corollary: the denial of racist motivations and structural inequality. In the battle of Whitman Park, neighborhood residents steadfastly denied that race was a motivating factor in their opposition to public housing. While they engaged a racially-coded discourse-by claiming public housing was related to crime rates, for example-they deliberately shunned the use of explicitly racist denunciations of integration. Indeed, their use of coded language itself represented an effort to obfuscate the racial politics of poverty, public housing, and welfare. As in other white ethnic, working class revolts against welfare entitlements, Philadelphia's opponents of public housing expressed their outrage through the language of populist discontent. In doing so, they made anti-poverty rhetoric more palatable, stripped it of overt racial bias, and developed a classcentric discourse based on the differentiation between earned privilege and unearned advantage. 13 Therefore, instead of invoking a "defensive localism" to protect their neighborhood's white identity, the Whitman Council discursively tried to redefine and preserve their community's class identity.
14 The Council's attempt to forge a race neutral neighborhood protectionism also led them to adopt an economically discriminatory defense of their community. Historians chronicling white working-class anti-liberalism in the postwar United States have so thoroughly concentrated on racial ideologies and "backlash" that they have overlooked the centrality of their class ideologies and identities. Blue-collar whites' ideas of social class often informed their conceptions of race and poverty, and vice versa. That these conceptions were often based in stereotypes and mistruths indebted to a racially and spatially segregated environment made them no less powerful or meaningful. The politics of class and race were inseparable components of the white, blue-collar rejection of welfare state liberalism.
Despite the Whitman Council's claims to the contrary, race remained central to the debate over public housing. In the urban North, housing and civil rights activists had linked public housing to racial and economic justice early on. 15 In Whitman, however, they faced a neighborhood protectionist movement that wanted to avoid a public racial dialogue. Comparing the neighborhood to the Jim Crow South was only one strategy housing activists implemented to ensure the debate remained about racial justice. When the Whitman Council adopted their class-based discourse, public housing advocates redirected their movement toward the pursuit of welfare rights by calling attention to the interconnected politics of race, gender, and poverty. Most important to this strategy, African American women-the highest percentage of public housing tenants-led the effort to open Whitman Park. Men like Milton Street gained the limelight, but black women from tenants' rights and open housing organizations forced the broader civil rights movement, federal courts, and wider public to engage the battle of Whitman Park on the grounds of racial and gender-defined rights and privileges. 16 Additionally, their efforts to publicly and legally maintain the relationship between the availability of low-cost public housing with racial and economic justice also caused their opponent's supposedly colorblind façade to fade.
Welfare rights activism developed in an increasingly conservative era, precisely as the national commitment to the welfare state-limited as it was in the United States-began to shrink. Therefore, focusing on how welfare rights activists interacted and reacted to their opponents sheds new light on their strategies, successes, and failures. Likewise, the development of race-conscious welfare rights advocacy revealed how central the defense of white privilege remained to public housing opposition. Confronted by a movement seeking the protection of race and gender based welfare rights, blue-collar whites' effort to create a class protectionist discourse also served as an important step in their political development and perception of poverty. In contrast to the public housing tenants and welfare recipients they classified as undeserving, they redefined their community as a class of hard-working people that earned their right to certain privileges. This line of argumentation allowed the Whitman Council to justify why they deserved the government assistance that, since the 1950s, helped create the community residents in the 1970s tried so fiercely to protect.
Community Development and the Politics of Public Housing: Planning Whitman Park
The Whitman Park controversy drew a lot of attention to the small South Philadelphia neighborhood in the late 1970s. Reporters uncovered the long history of the river ward community that older residents still called "the Neck," an early 20 th century nickname referencing its location near the confluence of the Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers. Long-time residents told stories about growing up in the area when it was still dotted with pig farms half a century earlier, long before anyone called it Whitman. In 1979, Temple University's Urban Archives Center chose Whitman residents to participate in a Discovering Community History oral history project. 17 Temple students conducted over a dozen interviews with present and former residents of the community, uncovering memories of the urban, immigrant, and ethnic experience across the century. Most of the interviewees were either Jewish or Roman Catholic. Some came to the United States when they were children. Others were the children of immigrants. All of the interviewees were first or second generation white ethnics. 18 While neighborhood memories were the focus of the oral histories, all of the respondents eventually addressed the present controversy. None of them understood how anyone could turn it into a racial issue. After all, nearly all of them remembered, Whitman was an integrated community until the 1950s. Most recalled that Whitman was not even a "white neighborhood" until the city razed the homes of the neighborhood's "colored" residents to make room for public housing. As Morris Jacobs, one of the founders of the Whitman Area Improvement Council-the precursor of the Whitman Council, Inc.-explained: "Now, where the public housing site is . . . that area was fairly well integrated. You had about, I'd say about ten percent colored in there, and you had a balance between Jewish and various sects of Christians." When asked how they interacted, he replied: "They got along fine. They got along very well. We never had any problems." 19 Postwar Philadelphia was one of the most racially segregated cities in the urban North. Yet all of the participants in the oral history project gave remarkably similar accounts of a peacefully integrated community. Undoubtedly, their memories oversimplified race relations at midcentury. By 1979, moreover, the stories of a formerly integrated and racially harmonious neighborhood had become key parts of the Whitman Council's defense against accusations of racism. 20 But the neighborhood was never quite as integrated as their memories suggested. In 1950, non-whites occupied only 108 out of 3,795 total dwelling units, fewer than three percent of a neighborhood in a city with a steadily growing African American population. 21 Informal segregation also meant most African Americas occupied homes along the area's perimeter, usually in the most run-down buildings. The highest percentage of black residency was along the neighborhood's eastern border, near the intersection of Front Street and Oregon Avenue. The Redevelopment Authority (RA) selected that site for the city's newest public housing project as part of the area's wide ranging urban renewal plan.
Badly deteriorating buildings pockmarked the still-unnamed community by midcentury. A 1957 RA survey deemed over four percent of its residential structures substandard. Eight percent of mixed use and sixty-eight percent of all nonresidential buildings fell into the same category. But the area had a relatively stable population. Its median income was slightly higher than that of the rest of Philadelphia, $3,100 a year compared to a $2,890 city-wide average. The majority of the residents worked blue-collar jobs as skilled craftsmen (18.3 percent), operatives (30.1 percent), and laborers (7.9 percent). Another large percentage worked in clerical positions (22.8 percent) and the service sector (7.8 percent). A small number in professional (4 percent) and managerial occupations (8.8 percent) rounded out the adult workforce. 22 It was also one of the few predominantly white areas of the inner city not yet experiencing an exodus to the suburbs or the rapidly developing Northeast section of Philadelphia. The City Planning Commission (CPC) hoped that designating the neighborhood for urban renewal would to encourage residents to remain in South Philadelphia. 23 Urban renewal offered wide-ranging improvements and changes to the community, not the least of which was a new identity. The area was still an unnamed 240-acre plot nestled between older industrial neighborhoods when the renewal process began. Working with city planners, residents created the Whitman Area Improvement Council (WAIC) as an independent neighborhood organization and took the neighborhood's name from the nearby and recently completed Walt Whitman Bridge. Along with the promise of general improvements to the quality of the community, urban renewal gave Whitman a name, a source of pride, and a mark of legitimacy and authenticity in a city that prided itself on being a "city of neighborhoods." 24 By giving Whitman residents a sense of place, urban renewal also began the process of creating a newly racialized space in South Philadelphia. The community's new name and changing demographics made Whitman a white neighborhood.
The racial politics of community development were an unintended consequence of Whitman's renewal. Rehabilitation of the city's older neighborhoods grew out of a political and policy renaissance in Philadelphia, one with an almost unprecedented commitment to equal opportunity and nondiscrimination. By the late 1950s, moreover, Philadelphia's urban renewal program had become a model for other cities to follow. 25 Yet, despite a stated dedication to working class and poor neighborhoods, urban renewal had an uneven impact throughout the city. Liberal politicians and city planners still favored the redevelopment of the central business district and maintenance of the middle-class tax base. Planners' inability to confront preexisting inequalities marred attempts to deliver a minimally disruptive renewal process, especially for residents of color. Long-established patterns of migration and settlement, reinforced by restrictive housing practices, resulted in almost fifty percent of the city's African American population living in areas targeted for renewal. In neighborhoods like Whitman, the negative impacts of urban renewal almost exclusively affected nonwhites. Its black population dwindled to less than one percent after the city cleared the homes at Front and Oregon. Despite promises from the CPC and RA, none of the displaced Whitman residents found housing in the neighborhood. 26 City planners originally envisioned a relatively swift clearance and construction in Whitman. They also hoped the new public housing complex would compensate the displaced. But they failed to account for the objections of the WAIC. 27 The organization was an active participant in every aspect of the neighborhood's rehabilitation. Their commitment to working with the city encouraged the CPC to select Whitman for its new conservation program, a more comprehensive renewal plan that combined public and private action to preserve neighborhoods threatened by "blighting influences." 28 In addition to public housing, Whitman's conservation plan called for a series of improvements, including several blocks of new private housing, a regional playfield, and a new shopping center. With an initial federal grant over $3.6 million, Whitman became the largest conservation area in Philadelphia. 29 Residents jumped at the chance to improve their homes and spruce up their neighborhood. "I never thought anything like this could happen," rejoiced one resident after he used grant money to give his small row home a fresh coat of paint, a new front door, and a new roof. The repairs simply would not have been possible on the seventy-one-year-old retiree's income. Others used the funds to install new kitchens, hang new wallpaper, and lower ceilings to reduce heating bills. By 1966, 387 low-to-moderate income families in Whitman received government aid to rehabilitate their homes.
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The community benefitted greatly from the renewal and conservation projects, but remained skeptical about the proposed public housing project. They understood that public housing was a planned part of Whitman's renewal from the outset, but protested the original design that called for a multi-building highrise project with the capacity for 260 residencies. 31 "The millions of local and government investments involved in the renewal program would be jeopardized," the organization's president wrote to the CPC in 1962. "Besides doing violation to the skyline in a neighborhood with only small buildings," he continued, "the high-rise structures will create serious density and traffic problems contrary to the objectives being carried out by the Redevelopment Authority." 32 The reservations expressed by the WAIC were not theirs alone. Philadelphia did not have a history of tenement-type public housing and reformers wanted to maintain the city's low-rise public housing program. 33 Reform organizations like the Philadelphia Housing Association (PHA) convinced the WAIC that a low-rise housing project would allay their concerns. In response, the WAIC expressed a willingness to accept public housing in their neighborhood if the city agreed to alter the project's design "to a walk-up instead of elevator buildings." 34 The WAIC then worked with city agencies and housing reformers to draft alternate designs for the project.
The PHA and other reform organizations advocated public housing that would fit in aesthetically with surrounding neighborhoods, increase space for lowincome families, and provide safer environments for children. They also hoped to eliminate the stigma that public housing bred crime, blight, and the perpetuation of poverty by working to incorporate new projects into larger communities. In the 1960s, the city implemented many of their recommendations, attempted to incorporate projects into broader communities, and recruited administrators from the housing reform movement. 35 But they could not completely dispel the negative connotations associated with public housing. In fact, the promise of public housing rarely coincided with living conditions in the projects or the realities of administering a citywide program. Living quarters in most complexes were cramped and subject to random inspection by social workers. Residents had little say over the Philadelphia Housing Administration (HA) policies. Furthermore, while the HA had a stated commitment to integrated facilities, most of the city's public housing remained thoroughly segregated and had a reputation as undesirable "black housing." 36 The Tasker Homes in South Philadelphia's Grays Ferry neighborhood reinforced many of the negative qualities associated with public housing. Once heralded as one of the city's best housing projects and proof that public housing could work, the Tasker Homes were in deplorable condition by the 1960s. Tenants complained of overcrowded and outdated facilities. Worse, Tasker residents called the project an "island of fear" because of its isolation from the surrounding neighborhood and the ever-present threat of robberies and violent crime. 37 Less than four miles from the proposed site in Whitman, the WAIC pointed to the Tasker Homes as an example of what they did not want in their community. 38 Both the WAIC and PHA wanted a design that would match the architecture of the existing neighborhood and would not contribute to the problems associated with projects like the Tasker Homes. 39 Their efforts finally came to fruition in 1967, when the city abandoned the high-rise design and replaced it with plans for 120 individual townhouses. The RA also planned the construction of a private townhouse development a few blocks from the public housing site. Unlike the Tasker Homes and other troubled housing developments, the renamed Whitman Park would blend into the neighborhood's built environment. 40 Additionally, the complex would be an altogether different type of public housing project called Turnkey III. Whitman Park would not only provide residents with individual homes and more privacy than other projects, Turnkey III also included a provision whereby residents of the rent-subsidized townhouses would have the option to purchase their homes after a period of years. Plans also called for a fully integrated development, with former residents displaced by urban renewal having the first choice of the townhouses. The new design and policies for Whitman Park were attempts at rectifying the problems associated with public housing and caused by urban renewal. 41 Proponents of Turnkey III hoped to end the stigma associated with public housing and provide social uplift through homeownership. The WAIC enthusiastically backed plan. Remarking on the organization's successful negotiations with the city, president Morris Jacobs said that the "unique 'turn-key' approach to be used in the Whitman Homes" showed an ideal standard of cooperation. Alice Moore, his successor, told the HA that the community was "very much impressed with the plans and feel that the design of these houses will make them an asset to our community." 42 Likewise, the PHA promoted the new project as the start of a new era for public housing. 43 The city soon signed a contract with Multicon Construction to build the townhouses and broke ground at Front and Oregon in December 1970. The HA expected Whitman Park to be ready for occupancy by early 1972. 44 By the time construction on Whitman Park began, Whitman was one of the leading communities in the country receiving federal grants and loans for individual homeowners. 45 For the residents, city and federal spending meant structural improvements and increased property values. It also gave them a sense of place, something to protect, and a fierce sense of loyalty toward their community. The WAIC took great pride in their neighborhood's redevelopment. But while they supported the plans for the Turnkey III housing development, population changes and internal neighborhood politics altered the public housing debate. Additionally, the success of Whitman's urban renewal created the racial and spatial structures under which that debate would take place, and inadvertently exacerbated the sense of earned class privilege that made it so acrimonious.
Class Privilege and Welfare Rights: The Battle for Whitman Park
Early on the morning of , a group of about thirty Whitman residents arrived at the Whitman Park construction site. Mostly women with their young children, they climbed atop bulldozers and blocked the path of construction crews that had come to begin their workday. They remained there, unmoved, until Philadelphia police officers forced them from the site. But they were undeterred. They returned to protest the construction site the following morning, and for several weeks thereafter. When Multicon obtained an injunction preventing the protesters from interfering with construction, the pickets grew in size and intensity. Protesters created human chains to blocked traffic. They targeted the construction workers, calling them "scabs" for crossing their picket line. Others targeted the potential residents of the new housing project and demanded that the city "Think of Our Welfare." 46 Although the Philadelphia Housing Association attempted to mediate a solution, the residents could not be swayed. They continued protesting the site until Multicon agreed to halt construction at the end of April. 47 The revamped Whitman Council, Inc. (WC) led the protests against Whitman Park, claiming they had not been informed about plans to build public housing. Although city planners worked closely with the WAIC and publicized the development widely, the Council had little contact with the larger community. Indeed, while testifying against the project in Common Pleas Court a few months later, several residents claimed that they had never met any member of the WAIC. 48 The council was made up of the neighborhood's small class of professionals. Lawyers, doctors, and white-collar managers represented a predominantly blue-collar neighborhood. Making matters worse, many of them began leaving. Former WAIC president Morris Jacobs, for example, moved to the Oxford Circle neighborhood in the city's Lower Northeast. Despite the city's efforts to maintain the area's population, the draw of the suburbs and Northeast Philadelphia was too much to keep upwardly mobile residents in Whitman. 49 By the time of the Whitman Park protests, then, both the community council and the community itself had changed dramatically. Newly aroused, the WC organized the neighborhood protectionist movement. While they continued pressing the city for renewal and community development funds, they made stopping the public housing project their primary goal.
Under the direction of new president Fred Druding, the reconstituted Whitman Council politicized and united the neighborhood as it had never been before. Elected in 1970, the politically driven Druding held the position for the next fifteen years. Prior to his community leadership, he helped found the Philadelphia Young Democrats, a short-lived youth auxiliary of the local Democratic Party. Thereafter, he repeatedly ran campaigns for elected office. Although he never rose above ward leader, Druding found an outlet for his political ambitions in the WC. Directing the opposition to Whitman Park and stewarding the council through its legal battles, the soft-spoken Druding created the Council's "colorblind" defense. His efforts hid deeper racial antipathies within the community. But his attempt to stress the community's class identity over its racial identity guided the Whitman Council's neighborhood protectionism. 50 Druding pursued legal options to halt construction while neighborhood protesters continued picketing the construction site. The press reveled in stories of Whitman women taking to the picket lines, lying down in front of bulldozers, and physically halting construction. "Ordinary housewives," they reported, compelled to take drastic action in defense of their neighborhood. 51 Protest organizer Gert Hogan received the most attention. She lived adjacent to the site and joined the picket lines every day. On several occasions, Hogan donned a Plains Indian headdress and rode a horse through the community to stir up neighbors against the "invasion." Her antics made her an easy choice for reporters wanting to sensationalize the protests. Adrian Lee, a conservative columnist for the Evening Bulletin, turned Hogan into a community icon. In a series of articles defending the Whitman community over the course of the 1970s, Lee put Gert Hogan at the center of the neighborhood's crusade. 52 Other reporters discussed her behavior, her neighborhood pride, and her ethnicity. "Gert is Irish," quipped one columnist. "Boy, is she Irish." Like Fred Druding, Hogan also denied that race influenced her community's opposition. "When people get something free, they treat it like junk," she said. "We're not racists," she continued. "Why, we had good colored people living here until the city took their houses. I wish they were back." 53 Protesters and sympathetic reporters presented the Whitman pickets as a working-class, white ethnic crusade. The picketers used their roles as wives and mothers driven and willing to take extraordinary measures to protect their families to deflect accusations that racism drove their protests.
Fred Druding and Gert Hogan expressed two varieties of the neighborhood's defense, but both displayed the community's overarching populist discontent with "liberal planners," building companies receiving government subsidies, and the welfare recipients who expected "something for nothing." Some residents said that Whitman Park would bring crime and blight into their neighborhood. Others claimed it was unfair for the Housing Authority to sell the units to lowincome families receiving federally subsidized mortgages, free utilities, and tax waivers. Although many of their complaints were unfounded-the Turnkey III program, for example, deemed residents responsible for their taxes and utilitiesthe protestors argued that housing subsidies went to people who had not earned them and punished people who had "worked hard." 54 Another woman, who believed that housing for the "irresponsible poor" would create an "instant slum," said the problem with the public housing was that it did not help the right people. Who did public housing benefit? "Not the poor people," she explained, "but the builders who are taking advantage of the subsidy." Those that did deserve the benefits were like the people of Whitman: "the real poor, the fellow who has sweated, alongside his wife, to save and struggle to pay for a home, and now is to be taxed to death to pay for the homes of others." 55 The economic populism expressed by Whitman protesters relayed a sense of victimization. Residents spoke of themselves as a class caught in the middle of out-of-touch city planners and the undeserving poor.
Whitman protesters continued expressing their populist discontent when they marched on City Hall and picketed outside the home of the Housing Association director. 56 They made targets of welfare state liberalism and welfare recipients themselves. But they carefully avoided explicit discussions of race in the process of establishing their blue-collar authenticity. Instead, they relied on denunciations of "crime" and "blight" that in the context of public housing in the urban north almost always referred to African American crime and communities. By articulating a dichotomy between their hard-working community that earned what little they had and the prospective public housing tenants that expected a handout from liberals, the WC effectively concealed the racial implications of their opposition in the popular and ostensibly colorblind language of aggrieved blue-collar authenticity.
In 1971, the WC won the attention of likeminded politicians. In May, outgoing mayor James H. J. Tate halted construction. 57 Later that year, the WC gained an even more powerful ally when former police commissioner Frank Rizzo won the mayoral election on a dual platform of "law and order" conservatism and anti-elitist populism. 58 In the late 1960s, police commissioner Rizzo earned a national reputation for his tough stance on crime and the heavy-handed tactics of his police force. He was enormously popular in white ethnic, blue collar neighborhoods like Whitman. Fred Druding, however, campaigned against him in the 1971 Democratic primary. "[W]hat we need today in the Mayor's office is a personal commitment to reason: rational ideas, not storm-trooper confrontation," Druding said in a statement endorsing Rizzo's opponent. A self-proclaimed liberal and civil rights sympathizer, Druding made an obvious reference to the former police commissioner, whose critics frequently used the terms "storm-trooper" or "Gestapo" to describe his law enforcement policies.
59 But Rizzo's blue-collar appeal was too strong among working-class, white ethnic Philadelphians. Most important to Whitman residents, he promised that he would not allow public housing in any neighborhood that opposed it in their community. In the election, Rizzo earned his highest margin of victory in Whitman's ward. His repeated assurance that he would not allow the construction of Whitman Park even made Fred Druding one of his most vocal supporters. 60 With the Whitman Council's backing, the Rizzo administration challenged Whitman Park in court. Construction ended when the city reached an out of court agreement with Multicon in December 1972. The Rizzo administration then ignored requests by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to restart the project. Although Rizzo cost the city a multi-million dollar settlement, the residents of Whitman thought it was a small price to pay. 61 At a victory celebration near the abandoned construction site, they cheered Rizzo and vowed their continued support of his political career. Fred Druding thanked the mayor as well, but credited the efforts of the community. "It's Gert's victory," he said. "And Multicon knows that if they show up again Gert will meet them at the gate." 62 Opposition to public housing pulled the Whitman community together in a way that racial homogeneity and shared urban space never accomplished. Protest, economic populism, and politicization over Whitman Park created the tight-knit community that the WC claimed the project threatened.
The Whitman community celebrated, but the battle for Whitman Park was far from over. While the WC reorganized and developed their populist argument against public housing, Philadelphia's housing reform movement underwent significant changes of its own. The Philadelphia Housing Association had been a bulwark of white, middle class progressivism for decades. But Cushing Dolbeare, the organization's executive director throughout the 1960s, thought it needed to be more responsive to the low-income community. Actively involved in a number of civic causes, she understood the broader changes taking place in the city, mostly as a result of the civil rights movement. " [T] here were also some questions being raised, I think quite rightly," she recalled, "as to whether an organization that was run by a middle class, intellectual white person could properly be responsive to the concerns of low-income minority people." 63 In the late 1960s, the PHA merged with the Fair Housing Council of the Delaware Valley, an organization working to securing suburban housing on a nondiscriminatory basis. The creation of the new Housing Association of the Delaware Valley (HADV) effectively brought private market fair housing advocacy and public housing reform into a single movement. 64 Dolbeare resigned her position when the HADV began focusing on Whitman Park, allowing women from the open housing movement to redirect the organization.
A new cadre of fair and open housing activists soon ensured that the effort to restart Whitman Park was fought on the grounds of racial and gender equality. New HADV director Shirley Dennis was active in the Fair Housing Council and civil rights organizations throughout the 1960s. Influenced by the local black power movement's battles for neighborhood services, housing, and jobs, Dennis tied the problems of poverty, racial segregation, and urban-suburban inequality into a single metropolitan crisis. Under her leadership in the 1970s, and unlike the PHA, the HADV became more action oriented and race conscious. 65 As the Whitman Council attempted to establish a race-neutral debate over Whitman Park, Dennis and the HADV made sure the effort to restart construction on Whitman Park was viewed as a struggle for racial housing equality. When Whitman residents began picketing, for example, Dennis denounced the coded language used by the WC to protest public housing without explicitly mentioning race. She issued a statement condemning the "racial innuendos that are constantly used to deprive people of decent housing."
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Dennis and the HADV further linked racial inequality and specifically gendered urban poverty through a cooperative relationship with the Residents Advisory Board (RAB), a women-led and women-centric tenants' organization working for better living conditions in public housing. Dennis and RAB president Rosetta Wylie became two of the main advocates behind the effort to restart construction on Whitman Park. 67 Wylie's experience particularly illustrated the struggles of poor black women in urban America that led to the burgeoning welfare rights movement A widow with six children, she had lived in public housing most of her life. In the 1960s, she became president of her own project's tenants' rights group in North Philadelphia's Richard Allen Homes. Wylie was instrumental in drawing attention to the poor conditions in the Richard Allen and Tasker Homes and securing federal funds to modernize both developments. By the early 1970s, she was president of the RAB and vice president of the National Tenants Organization (NTO), where she helped organize tenants in both private and public housing. 68 Her experiences with the RAB and NTO made Wylie an advocate for the equitable distribution of welfare state resources, an advocacy she extended to the effort to restart construction on Whitman Park.
When work stopped in Whitman, Wylie led a protest against the construction of the Society Hill Towers, a heavily subsidized housing development for wealthy Philadelphians near the Old City historic district. 69 She then penned an open letter to the Whitman community. Attempting to appeal to the Whitman Council's class-based argumentation and populist discontent, she shared her agreement with the WC's claim that housing subsidies were unfairly distributed. But, she pleaded, "The target should not be housing for low income Philadelphians." Instead, the Whitman Council should join with the RAB in protesting the Society Hill project. She insisted that the real injustice of housing subsidies was the amount of money spent to build luxury homes that neither the tenants she represented nor the people of Whitman could possibly afford. Closing her letter with an invitation to join her at Society Hill, she implored the people of Whitman to see what they shared in common. 70 No member of the Whitman Council joined Wylie's protest. Whitman residents did not agree that they shared common class interests with the people Rose Wylie represented. As their public statements attested, they viewed themselves as a more privileged social class. But they did not point to their higher incomes or economic status as a means of differentiation. Instead, they adopted a notion of class privilege based upon their view of how they "earned" their homes and incomes. By their own definition, they deserved what they had because they earned it through "hard work." They used this same discourse of blue-collar authenticity to justify their entitlement to federal and city funding for programs like urban renewal and neighborhood development. 71 Because they worked hard, saved, and maintained their own homes, they earned the right to government benefits. Public housing tenants were not similarly entitled because they had not earned their homes through hard work. The WC insisted upon the unfairness of providing "giveaways" to the poor. 72 Their selective rejection of welfare state spending drew a sharp distinction between hardworking people like themselves and those dependent upon "handouts." Their discourse on hard work simultaneously celebrated their own work ethic while denigrating the supposed failings of public housing tenants and welfare recipients.
Shirley Dennis and Rose Wylie recognized the implications, especially for poor women of color. The Whitman Council constructed their neighborhood's class privilege in a way that denied access to entitlements by exclusion. While they were very careful not to mention race or gender, the majority of public housing tenants were African American women. In response to the Whitman community's recalcitrance, the RAB and HADV redirected their efforts by adopting a race, gender, and class conscious anti-poverty advocacy. They focused not just on Whitman Park, but on gaining equitably distributed city and federal resources for all needy peoples. "Poor people-blacks, whites, and Puerto Ricans are citizens," the RAB announced in the Philadelphia Tribune, the city's premier African American newspaper. "They are people who like all citizens received the promise of the federal government for safe and decent homes as a basic an undeniable human right." While insisting upon the government's duty to provide low-cost housing, they condemned the "intolerant and (racist) motivations" that delayed the goal of quality housing for all. 73 By combining welfare rights with the larger pursuit of racial and gender equality, the RAB illustrated how the politics of poverty related to struggle for civil rights.
Their efforts inspired others. Instead of attacking the Whitman community, however, tenants' rights and civil rights organizations targeted the Rizzo administration. Frank Rizzo had long been a target of liberals and civil rights activists for repeated attacks on civil rights organizations by police under his command. 74 His housing policies came under similar attacks shortly after he became mayor. Organizations like the HADV, RAB, and others advocating welfare rights especially worried about Rizzo's willingness to enable the creation of needed low-cost housing. Their fears were confirmed when his administration brokered the deal to end construction on Whitman Park. Immediately thereafter, an ad hoc Citizens Committee for Tenants' Rights issued a statement explicitly linking the mayor's racist reputation to his administration's opposition to public housing in Whitman and the denial of federal resources to the black poor. 75 The RAB and HADV succeeded in making Rizzo a symbol of impediments to housing equality in Philadelphia.
The RAB charged the Rizzo administration with violating federal antidiscrimination laws. Enlisting the assistance of Community Legal Services (CLS), a non-profit organization that provided legal representation to low-income complainants, the RAB filed suit in Federal District Court. By charging the Rizzo administration with breaking equal opportunity housing laws, they forced the court to consider Whitman Park as a civil rights case. 76 But the effort to restart Whitman Park meant more than the realization of a single housing project. Proponents of Whitman Park considered it symbolic of the larger poverty politics in urban America, especially in Frank Rizzo's Philadelphia. "The continuation of this policy, which would be implicit in any settlement other than getting the Whitman Project built," wrote CLS lawyer Jonathon Stein, "subverts any present or future efforts toward integrated low-income in the City." 77 Their call to action attracted more housing and civil rights activists. People like Milton Street and Charles Bowser as well as organizations like the local NAACP and Urban League all joined the effort because they worried that a Rizzo victory would embolden other white neighborhoods and jeopardize their years of work for integrated housing.
78 They in turn adopted the welfare rights discourse of the RAB and HADV. 79 The RAB and HADV successfully made the Whitman Park dispute about racial and gender-defined welfare rights. The Federal Court case solidified their effort to make housing equality the controversy's central issue. The Whitman Council's attempt to establish a racially neutral debate failed. While they maintained their class-based neighborhood protectionism, when the battle of Whitman Park turned rancorous after the court's decision and combined with Frank Rizzo's city politics, the neighborhood's colorblindness also began to wear thin.
Civil Rights and the Limits of Colorblindness: Protesting Whitman Park
Federal Judge Raymond Broderick presided over the RAB's case to restart Whitman Park. The Nixon appointee, former lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania, and 1970 Republican Party nominee for governor of Pennsylvania was a staunch conservative. The press predicted that he would side with Rizzo and Whitman. But CLS lawyers produced ample evidence that the former WAIC participated in Whitman Park's planning. They also relied on lengthy testimonies that highlighted the structural impediments to integration and brought the inequality of the housing market to the forefront of the Whitman Park dispute. 80 The arguments swayed Broderick. Calling Philadelphia a segregated city, he ruled that the Rizzo administration violated anti-discrimination laws and contributed to the city's racial segregation. Broderick ordered construction on Whitman Park to recommence immediately. 81 Housing and civil rights activists hailed the decision. The Philadelphia Tribune also called it a "major victory for minorities." One letter writer plainly called it a "victory over racism." 82 The RAB and others that stressed the connection between Rizzo's housing policies and urban inequality succeeded in convincing a wider black public of the same. As the Rizzo administration slowed the process with a series of appeals, they also pressured HUD to enforce the Broderick's ruling. The agency finally threatened to cut off federal funding to the city if construction did not begin. 83 In Whitman, residents responded to news they had lost their final appeal by emptying into the streets to protest. They burned Judge Raymond Broderick in effigy. 84 Fred Druding hoped to steer his community's opposition toward compromise and lawful recourse. But mounting legal debts gave the WC few options. Whitman residents felt angry and betrayed-by their government for sanctioning the housing project, at the courts for "forcing" public housing into their neighborhood, and by the movements that called the government and courts into action. 85 Their anger boiled over into the streets of Whitman and into the community newsletter Druding founded, the Whitman News. Like many of Druding's endeavors, the newsletter made the WC more democratic and responsive to the community. In addition to keeping neighbors abreast of developments concerning Whitman Park, it advertised WC-sponsored events and delivered news about birth, marriage, death announcements. By communicating a common identity, the newsletter helped create the close-knit community that Druding claimed the housing project threatened. 86 In order to project a sense of common identity through common cause, Druding also reprinted letters he received from sympathetic politicians and residents. In June 1976, for example, while the case was still in Federal Court, the following letter from resident Barry Mitchell appeared in the Whitman News:
I am writing to express my anger at some statements made recently-in the newspapers-by CLS [Community Legal Services] spokesmen.
How can they ignore the fact that in South Phila projects-Wilson Park, Tasker Homes, etc.-it is young toughs who beat and rob the tenants forcing them to flee.
Isn't anyone honest enough to admit that what has happened to these once fine projects? Why aren't the Project Managers speaking out that it is the tenants who are responsible for the broken elevators, crime, dirt, vandalism, etc.
As I said, the young toughs and bad tenants force the good to flee.
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The letter echoed many of the sentiments trumpeted by WC since the beginning of their opposition to Whitman Park. It made the correlation between public housing and crime, blight, and neighborhood deterioration that relied on subtlety rather than explicit race baiting. It struck the chords of civility and colorblindness that Fred Druding and the WC adopted early on. The letter in the Whitman News, however, was not the letter Druding received. Mitchell originally wrote:
Am sending you a copy of these articles (you may have seen already) to express my anger at some of the statements made by CLS lawyers.
How could they ignore the FACT that in So[uth] Phila[delphia] alone, Shipyard Homes, Wilson Park and Tasker Homes were once all white projects and are now all Blac-in their attempt to "desegregate" Public Housing. Where were they 30 or more years ago! Are they aware how black toughs intimidate white tenants, forcing them to flee (Shipyard, Wilson, Tasker & Schuylkill Homes-to name a few) and that these are projects NOW cited as examples to force integration in virgin, new areas as Whitman? These poor whites tried, oh how they tried-to make it with the newcomer Blacks and eventually were forced to flee by crime and intimidation.
It's unfair, grossly unfair-to now charge that Blacks are being "segregated" and to point to these projects, yet, isn't anyone honest enough to admit what has happened. Why haven't Project Managers, like Cavanaugh and others complained bitterly that some black tenants are responsible for busted elevators, crime, filth, graffiti and vandalism again and again in answer to Black complaints, to conditions there.
The fact is, they (the toughs) segregate themselves by forcing others to flee. 88 Fred Druding carefully edited Mitchell's letter for punctuation, grammar, and readability. Most importantly, he removed any mention of race before printing it in the Whitman News. Both the original and the edited version demonstrate how thoroughly concepts like "crime" and "blight" became stand-ins for race. Mitchell was not the only Whitman resident sending similar letters to Druding, but he was the most prolific among them. Mitchell sometimes sent one or two letters a week, often with newspaper clippings, photographs, or frequently, his own hand-drawn maps. By the late 1970s, when Whitman Park's completion seemed inevitable, Mitchell began sending maps of where he wanted African Americans placed in the project. He chose the row of townhouses along the easternmost edge of the site. It was the furthest point from the rest of the neighborhood. Also, Mitchell mistakenly believed that the city planned to build an on-ramp to the adjacent Delaware Expressway that would require a widening of Front Street. In his assumption, African American residents would be forced back out of the neighborhood when construction of the ramp began. 89 Despite the fact that he later took offense when Charles Bowser compared opponents of Whitman Park with southern segregationists, he clearly showed how far the WC went to conceal the some of the racist motivations behind the community's opposition to public housing.
The WC never gave much credence to Mitchell's wilder suggestions and Fred Druding maintained his own colorblindness and liberalism well into the late 1970s. 90 He was also savvy enough to understand that by the 1970s a white protectionist defense of neighborhood rights was no longer politically viable. By actively hiding the racism underlying some of his community's opposition to Whitman Park, he showed how well he understood the ways the civil rights movement had changed the racial discourse on rights and poverty. Druding still tried to deflate accusations of racism. He stressed the neighborhood's history as formerly integrated and again tried to redirect the debate to a colorblind discourse on earned privilege and unearned advantage. 91 But the HADV and RAB, now aided by skilled politicians like Milton Street, maintained that racial and gender equality was at stake. In 1978, as Whitman residents and African American protesters clashed, the community's continued support for embattled mayor Frank Rizzo caused their colorblind veneer to wear even thinner.
Rizzo's knack for inflammatory rhetoric coupled with his staff of talented economic advisors made his two-term mayoralty a mix of growth liberalism and populist conservatism. 92 Although his scandal-ridden mayoralty cost him some support, Rizzo's appeal never waned in white ethnic, blue-collar neighborhoods like Whitman. Shortly after the Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal to stop construction on Whitman Park, Rizzo called a meeting in the neighborhood. With the end of his second term was in sight, residents hoped he would announce plans to change the city's Home Rule Charter so that he could run for a third term. They greeted him with chants of "four more years." Rizzo disappointed them when he announced he was ending his political career, but reassured them that he would keep fighting on their behalf. "It's not only Whitman Park the liberals want to destroy," he said, "but all neighborhoods." He then told his audience that they had the right to "neighborhood purity" and that they needed to "join hands" with other white ethnics. "I'm willing to do battle for every neighborhood of Philadelphia, for all the ethnic groups that came here and got nothing free and asked for nothing," he said before going on a tirade against programs that gave "special privileges" nonwhites. "My parents and your parents got no special treatment," he said to thunderous applause. He then said he planned to become "a national spokesman" for "white ethnic rights."
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Months later, Rizzo responded to a groundswell of support by deciding to seek a charter change amendment and third mayoral term. While campaigning for the amendment in Northeast Philadelphia, in another predominantly white neighborhood fighting another planned public housing project, Rizzo claimed that local and national black leaders were asking African American Philadelphians to "'vote black'" in the election. Turning to his own campaign, he said: "I'm going to say to the people of this city: 'vote white,' and the black people who think like me, and there are a lot of them. . . ." Rizzo never had the opportunity to finish his sentence. The crowd erupted into applause at the directive to "vote white."
94 Fred Druding and the Whitman Council had spent the past decade cultivating a colorblind argument against opposition pubic housing. Despite the concealed racial antipathies, their effort remained a significant step in the community's attempt to create a raceneutral class identity. Frank Rizzo belied that effort when he told a Whitman audience to organize for white ethnic rights and told another group of public housing opponents to vote white. He also confirmed what proponents of the Whitman Park had said for years: public housing was a racial issue.
That revelation was hardly news to housing activists. More importantly, however, by engaging Whitman Park's opponents in their own class-based arguments, they made civil rights leaders and the wider black public take notice of the intractability of race and the politics of poverty. By 1978, Frank Rizzo provided a catalyst for a more unified effort. His racially divisive charter change campaign rallied his opponents as much as it did his supporters. The vote on the amendment became a referendum on his political career and housing policies. The amendment failed by a margin of nearly two to one. African American voter turnout was the highest in the Philadelphia's electoral history. 95 Even when Rizzo had no authority over the controversy, his Whitman supporters still felt they had political options left. Once he was gone, the WC held a special election where Whitman residents overwhelmingly voted to go "back to the streets." They once again blocked traffic and stopped construction crews. Stressing their neighborhood's blue-collar identity, they carried signs demanding the union construction workers not to cross the "Whitman Picket Line." When they ignored the protesters, one resident set up a loudspeaker system and used it to daily blast polka music and verbally harass the workers, calling them "scabby scumbo" for crossing a picket line. Symbolically, protesters hung ribbons around the neighborhood and staged a mock funeral for Gert Hogan. Lying in a coffin, she clutched a copy of the US Constitution while passing neighbors mourned the collective loss of their neighborhood. A few local politicians worked on the WC's behalf. Introducing bills into City Council, they tried rezoning the site, commissioning environmental studies, and claiming that the city could no longer afford building costs. The WC even appealed directly to the new Reagan administration. By the 1980s, however, they no longer had the backing of City Hall. New mayor William Green III was a reform liberal intent on repudiating the divisiveness of the Rizzo administration. The WC's maneuvering caused delays, but Green ensured that construction continued. Frustrated Whitman residents hung a large sign across the street from the construction site. The first residents of Whitman Park moved into the complex in October 1982. At least one of the families had been displaced by urban renewal in the 1950s. Local residents did not protest the move-in, but neither did they welcome their new neighbors with open arms. Wounds from the extraordinarily long battle were slow to mend. Almost ten years later, however, veteran reporter Murray Dubin revisited the neighborhood. Dubin talked to residents of the housing project and the larger community. To his surprise, he found the neighborhood had healed. Several Whitman Park tenants were about to own their townhouses through Turnkey III and claimed they felt no stigma living in the complex. A few residents of the wider community expressed resentment at the housing project. By and large, however, Dubin found many long-time residents, including a few who fought and picketed the project, not only learned to live with Whitman Park, but came to appreciate it as well. One former picketer told Dubin she thought it was "a nice thing. The homes there look a far sight better than the vacant land." Dubin left the neighborhood with one conclusion: "Whitman Park-120 units of public housing-works." 97 In contrast to most postwar American public housing history, Whitman Park is a success story. But success did not come without consequences. In the early 1980s, Fred Druding and the Whitman Council worked behind the scenes to determine the project's demographics. They helped broker a deal for a racial balance whereby fifty percent of Whitman Park residents had to be white, publicly contradicting claims of their own colorblindness. Perhaps more important, the WC pressured the Housing Authority and the federal government to raise the minimum income of Whitman Park residents. Ronald Reagan's HUD responded to the WC's requests and raised income requirements to make "moderate income people more eligible." The new regulations stipulated that tenants earn between $11,760 and $25,895 and mandated that they could not receive any other form of welfare. The residents of Whitman Park would have incomes closer to those of the rest of the community. The poorest Philadelphians, however, were left out. 98 Prior to its end, the battle of Whitman Park was one of the most divisive issues in Philadelphia. Combined with the planning and politics of Whitman's urban renewal and community development, it was also one of the longest conflicts over a liberal welfare program in American history. The city's postwar urban renewal created the structural foundations of the conflict by making the Whitman community and establishing it as white space. Aroused by the reorganization of urban space along racial lines, housing and tenants' rights activists linked the politics of race, gender, and poverty to the pubic housing controversy. The recognition of these linkages led to a broader commitment to and advocacy for a race-conscious welfare liberalism. Despite their efforts in conflicts like the one to open Whitman Park, however, the 1980s ushered in a national retreat from liberalism aided by their opponents' political development in the 1970s.
The same spatial politics and racial reorganization that changed Philadelphia's housing movement laid the groundwork for white blue-collar Whitman's populist revolt against "liberal planners" and welfare recipients that expected "something for nothing." Their politicization changed the neighborhood from a predominantly Democratic ward to one that supported Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984. Even Fred Druding, founder of the Young Democrats and self-proclaimed liberal, ran in his last campaign for public office as a Republican candidate for state representative. 99 More importantly, and despite the advantages their own community reaped from federal spending, Whitman residents turned against the welfare state. Emblematic of a larger white blue-collar shift away from American liberalism, Whitman residents selectively rejected liberal programs like public housing while encouraging programs that benefited communities similar to their own. In the process of fighting the project, moreover, they learned to accept greater disparities in wealth as a tolerable result of those who "worked hard" for what they received. As federal funding for American cities fell to new lows during the Reagan administration, white working and lowermiddle class Americans like those in Whitman accepted the changes in the nation's political economy. Their selective rejection of federal spending was not a complete break with the politics that guided American liberalism since the New Deal, but a qualified means of using class distinctions to determine entitlement.
In Philadelphia, the public housing controversy ended with little fanfare. But when welfare rights activists and opponents of public housing clashed in the battle of Whitman Park, they demonstrated the central dispute underlying poverty politics in recent United States' history. Predominantly non-white welfare rights advocates influenced by the Black Freedom Struggle recognized the inseparability between the politics of race, gender, and poverty in urban America. Poverty, as they also understood, is no accident. It is actively created and maintained by the very structures that create structural privileges. But as the white working and lower-middle class people of Whitman accepted economic inequality while rejecting race-conscious state welfare, they accepted the changing discourse on poverty to a far more obstinate critique of the "undeserving poor." White working-and lower-middle class opponents of the welfare state, as opponents of Whitman Park exemplify, learned to avoid debates on structural inequalities by engaging a class discourse based upon a culturally-defined notion of earned privilege and unearned advantage that simultaneously allowed them to publicly maintain their own colorblindness. As in Whitman, where community leaders attempted to create an image of their own racial neutrality by averting claims to shared whiteness in favor of a common class identity based upon the values of hard work, sacrifice, and blue-collar authenticity, the broader process of accepting a nominally colorblind version of poverty policy all but ensured that racial segregation would persist into the later twentieth century. Opponents of public housing lost the battle of Whitman Park, but they represented a larger shift in the politics and perception of poverty and entitlement that culminated a national retreat from race-conscious welfare liberalism.
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